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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Julian Martin Valencia appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing his
post-conviction relief petition.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The district court’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss set forth the relevant underlying facts and
proceedings as follows:
After entering an Alford plea to an indictment of Battery with Intent to
Commit a Serious Felony in case CR-2013-2874, Julian Valencia moved the Court
to withdraw his plea and proceed with a jury trial, and the State objected. The Court
denied Valencia’s motion and ordered a presentence investigation (“PSI”) and a
psychosexual evaluation (“PSE”), which were prepared and filed in September,
2013. On January 17, 2014, the Court sentenced Valencia to four (4) years fixed,
six (6) indeterminate. Valencia appealed.
On May 11, 2015, the Idaho Court of Appeals vacated the District Court’s
denial of Valencia’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remanded the case for
further proceedings in an unpublished opinion. State v. Valencia, No[.] 41796, 2015
WL 2185240 (Idaho Ct. App. May 11, 2015). The Court of Appeals noted that the
record was unclear as to whether a persistent violator enhancement was or was not
part of the agreement, rendering his plea involuntary. ld.
Following the appeal, the State reinstated case CR-2013-5380, charging
Valencia with three counts of violation of a no-contact order (“NCO”), a felony,
and moved to consolidate the charges with his battery case CR-2013-2874, which
the Court denied. On October 14, 2015, the State tried Valencia before a jury on
the charge of Battery with Intent to Commit Rape. On the second day, it ended in
a mistrial when Valencia’s counsel cross-examined the sexual assault nurse about
[an inappropriate subject]. Trial Transcript, p.3l4, ll. 14-19, Nov. 18, 2015.
On December 3, 2015, the day set for jury trial, Valencia entered an Alford
plea pursuant to a Rule 1l Agreement. The Court entered Judgment on January 6,
2016, sentencing Valencia to four (4) years fixed, and six (6) indeterminate, with
credit for 1054 days served. J&C, p. 1, Jan. 6, 2016.
On January 13, 2017, Valencia filed a verified pro se Petition for PostConviction Relief and moved the Court to take judicial notice of the underlying
criminal records in their entirety. The State filed its answer without including any
1

portions of the record. On October 17, 2017, Valencia filed his First Amended
Verified Petition[1] alleging the following claims:
....
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Trial counsel advised the
Petitioner that if he did not plead guilty on December 15, 2015 by
signing the Plea Agreement, the State would file a new change of
Forcible Sexual Penetration by use of a Foreign Object “where the
victim is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act because the
victim: (a.) was unconscious or asleep; or (b.) was not aware,
knowing, perceiving or cognizant that the act occurred.” See Idaho
Code § 18-6603(4). Trial counsel was aware that the alleged act
occurred on January 27, 2013, but did not inform the Petitioner that
the code section stated did not go into effect until July l, 20l4. See
S.L. 2014, ch. 165, eff July 1, 2014. Trial counsel’s performance
fell beneath an objective standard of reasonableness and if they had
performed differently, the result would have been different.
(R., pp.102-104 (original footnote omitted, explanation added).)
The state filed an Answer to the First Amended Petition. (R., pp.96-98.) The district court
entered a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (R., pp.102-111), and Valencia filed a response (R., pp.112118). After the state filed a Motion for Judicial Notice (Supp. R., pp.2-4), the district court entered
an Order (R., pp.99-100) taking judicial notice of the following:
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

Court Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings of Jury Trial for State v.
Valencia, CR-2013-2874, Nov. 18, 2015.
The Court Minutes of the jury trial/change of plea hearing in State v.
Valencia, CR-2015-23313, CR-20I5-16500, CR-2015-21619, CR-20132874, Dec. 3, 2015.
The Court Minutes of the sentencing hearing in State v. Valencia, CR-201523313, CR-2015-21619, CR-2013-2874, Dec. 15, 2015.
The Rule 11 Plea Agreement in State v. Valencia, CR-2015-23313.
The Guilty Plea Advisory form in State v. Valencia, CR-2015-23313.
The Judgment and Commitment in State v. Valencia, CR-2015-23313, Jan.
6, 2016.

1

Valencia filed a motion for appointed counsel (R., pp.60-63), which was granted January 23,
2017 (R., pp.72-73).
2

The district court set an evidentiary hearing date on Valencia’s post-conviction claims. (R.,
pp.163-164.) Valencia filed a Supplemental Response to Notice of Intent to Dismiss (R., pp.165168), and after the parties stipulated for the court to rule on its Notice of Intent to Dismiss (and
vacate the court’s previously set evidentiary hearing (R., pp.169-173), the court entered an Order
Dismissing Petition and Final Judgment, summarily dismissing Valencia’s post-conviction
petition (R., pp.174-182, 194-195). Valencia timely appealed. (R., pp.183-186, 197-202.)

3

ISSUE
Valencia states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Valencia’s postconviction petition?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Valencia failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by summarily dismissing
his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim related to his acceptance of the state’s plea offer?

4

ARGUMENT
Valencia Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing
His Ineffective Assistance Of Trial Counsel Claim Related To His Acceptance Of The State’s
Plea Offer
A.

Introduction
Valencia contends the district court erred by summarily dismissing his post-conviction

petition. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-19.) Valencia assigns error to the court’s dismissal of his claim
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that, prior to 2014, the offense the
state threatened to file against him if he refused the state’s plea offer – forcible penetration with a
foreign object, I.C. § 18-6608 – did not apply to him because the victim was asleep at the outset
of the penetration. (Id.) Valencia has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred.

B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary

hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists based on the
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file.” Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007).

C.

Standards Applicable To Summary Dismissal Of Post-Conviction Claims And Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel Claims
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil
proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d
548, 550 (1983).

5

Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction
relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own initiative, if the applicant “has not
presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims upon
which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738,
739 (1998). Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction application
are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, deemed true. Cooper v.
State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). However, the court is not required to accept
either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the
applicant’s conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001);
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). Bare assertions and
speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not make out a prima facie case for ineffective
assistance of counsel. Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903. Further, allegations contained
in a post-conviction petition are insufficient for granting relief when they are clearly disproved by
the record of the original proceeding or do not justify relief as a matter of law. Workman, 144
Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007).
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate
both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 68788 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). Under Strickland,
a defendant must demonstrate both that (1) his counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and (2) a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result
of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, 694; Aragon v.
State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988). There is a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v. State,

6

110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243,
1248 (Ct. App. 1989). In assessing the prejudice prong in the context of guilty pleas, the United
States Supreme Court has explained the focus is upon “whether counsel’s constitutionally
ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
59 (1985). The Court explained, “in other words, in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement,
the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id.; Cosio-Nava v. State,
161 Idaho 44, 48, 383 P.3d 1214, 1218 (2016).

D.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That Valencia Failed To Make A Prima Facie
Showing For Post-Conviction Relief With Respect To His Ineffective Assistance Of Trial
Counsel Claim Regarding Plea Offer Advice
Valencia asserts that he presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his trial

attorneys were ineffective by failing to advise him that the prosecutor’s alleged threat – that if he
did not accept the plea offer, she would dismiss the charge of battery with intent to commit rape
and file a new charge of forcible penetration with a foreign object – was not viable under the law
that existed at the time of the alleged offense in 2013. 2 (See generally Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-19.)

2

In State v. Smith, 159 Idaho 177, 179, 357 P.3d 1285, 1287 (Ct. App. 2015), the Court of Appeals
explained the former law:
Idaho Code § 18–6608, as it existed when the alleged crime occurred, provided that
“every person who, for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse, causes
the penetration, however slight, of the genital . . . opening of another person, by any
object, instrument or device, against the victim’s will by use of force . . . shall be
guilty of a felony.” The Idaho Supreme Court recently interpreted the clause
providing that the penetration must be “against the victim’s will by use of force” in
State v. Elias, 157 Idaho 511, 337 P.3d 670 (2014). It explained that the clause
“clearly requires that: (1) the victim is aware of the impending penetration; (2) that
the victim’s will is that penetration should not occur; and (3) the victim’s will is of
no effect due to the defendant’s use of force.” Id. at 517, 337 P.3d at 676.
7

Valencia further asserts that, had he known that the prosecutor’s threat was legally baseless, he
would not have pled guilty pursuant to the state’s plea offer. 3 (Id., pp.12-13.)
In its Order Dismissing Petition (R., pp.174-182), the district court concluded that (1) the
prosecutor’s alleged threat to dismiss Valencia’s current charge and file a new charge (forcible
penetration with a foreign object) did not exist, (2) Valencia’s decision to accept the plea offer was
based on his desire to avoid (a) a persistent violator enhancement and (b) having to register as a
sex offender, and (3) Valencia’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary – not the result of any
coercion. For its response to Valencia’s argument on appeal, the state relies upon and incorporates,
as if fully set forth herein, the district court’s Order Dismissing Petition (R., pp.174-182), which
is attached to this brief as Appendix A. In addition to the court’s analysis and conclusions in its
Order Dismissing Petition, the state makes the following arguments in support of the court’s Order.
1.

The District Court Correctly Determined That The Record Belies Valencia’s Claim
That The Prosecutor Threatened To Dismiss His Pending Charge And Charge Him
With Forcible Penetration With A Foreign Object If He Refused The Plea Offer

During the plea entry and the sentencing hearings, defense counsel and the prosecutor made
it clear that the prosecutor had considered, if Valencia refused the plea offer (1) whether she could
dismiss his pending charge (battery with intent to commit rape) and charge him with forcible

In 2014, Idaho Code § 18-6608 was amended to allow conviction for forcible penetration by
foreign object when, inter alia, the victim “[w]as unconscious or asleep[.]” I.C. § 18-6608 (4)(a).
3

Valencia’s First Amended Verified Petition asserted that his trial counsel advised him “that, if
he did not plead guilty on December 15, 2015, by signing the Plea Agreement, the State would file
a new cha[r]ge of Forcible Sexual Penetration by use of a Foreign Object . . . .” (R., p.92 (emphasis
added); see R., p.23 (First Declaration of Petitioner) (emphasis added) (“if I chose not to take it
the state would file a new charge of Forcible Sexual Penetration”).) However, on appeal, Valencia
contends “the issue is whether [he] was told by his attorneys that the State was not going to bring
the charge at the time he pleaded guilty” (Appellant’s Brief, pp.14-15 (emphasis added).) The
district court’s decision was based on Valencia’s affirmative claim that “he pled guilty because the
State threatened to charge him under the forcible penetration statute” (R., p.179) – not that his trial
counsel failed to tell him that the state “was not going to bring” such charge.
8

penetration with a foreign object, and (2) assuming a verdict (or finding) of guilt on one of
Valencia’s felony violation of a no contact order charges, whether such verdict could be used to
charge Valencia as a persistent violator in his battery with intent to commit rape case. The
following discussion took place during the plea entry hearing:
Defense Counsel: Anyways Judge, I wanted to put on the record . . . that the basis
for why my client is availing himself of this agreement for several issues . . . .
Obviously the potential consequences of being found guilty and that the . . . what
could potentially happen if he is found guilty [inaudible] with regard to all the cases
the state has indicated several times as well as on the record, that they intend on
filing a persistent violator . . . . Additionally, I had conversations with Ms. Kallin .
. . about the state’s potentially, and that there was apparently at some point . . . there
was about dismissing and filing of a different charge . . . . I think that also played
a role in that, but we did have conversations with regards to that and I just wanted
to put that on the record.
Judge: Okay
Defense Counsel: And I’m not saying that the state was going to . . . we just had
conversations about them having the ability to do so.
(Audio Ex. Dist Court4_20151203-1006, 7:33-8:35 (emphasis added).)
Even assuming that, at the outset of the plea entry hearing, Valencia believed the state was
“potentially” going to charge him with forcible penetration with a foreign object if he did not
accept the plea offer, that belief was undone by defense counsel’s comments. 4 They show that,

4

Toward the end of the plea entry hearing, the district court was concerned about why Valencia
had written on his guilty plea form (question 14) that he was pleading guilty due to “duress.”
(Audio Ex. Dist Court4_20151203-1006, 40:10-40:18.) Valencia told the court that he had “just a
short amount of time” to decide whether to accept the prosecutor’s offer, that he “would be subject
to a persistent violator if found guilty,” “as well as the potential dismissal of the case on the battery
issue” and refiling it “as a different issue.” (Id., 40:20-40:52 (emphasis added).) Upon further
discussion about “duress,” Valencia’s counsel stated, “Judge, I think it’s not necessarily duress,
it’s just, I think it’s just . . . all of the issues that we put on the record that my client . . . is trying to
avoid potential consequences if he is convicted, and . . . as far as the state’s filing, whether he
could potentially face as far as . . . any sort of, I guess, conviction, if there was conviction in the
future . . . .” (Id., 42:36-43:12 (emphasis added).) During the plea entry hearing, Valencia did not
assert that he was informed that the prosecution would actually charge him with forcible
penetration with a foreign object if he rejected its plea offer.
9

although defense counsel and the prosecutor conversed about whether the state had the ability to
file a forcible penetration charge, the prosecutor did not say she would file such a charge if Valencia
did not accept her plea offer. (See id., 8:25-8:35 (“And I’m not saying that the state was going to
. . . we just had conversations about them having the ability to do so.”).) Regardless of what
Valencia may have believed up to that point, the record shows he was informed by his counsel’s
comments prior to his guilty plea that the prosecutor did not threaten that she “would file” (see R.,
pp.22-23, 92) a new charge of forcible penetration with a foreign object if he rejected the plea offer
– the opposing attorneys simply discussed the state’s ability to do so. 5
Twelve days after entering his guilty plea, at the beginning of his sentencing hearing,
Valencia made what the district court deemed an oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Audio
Ex. Dist Court4_20151203-1006, 00:00-04:12.) Valencia alleged for the first time that the
prosecutor actually threatened to dismiss the current charge and file a new charge of forcible
penetration with a foreign object if he did not accept the state’s plea offer. (Id.) After listening to
Valencia’s assertion in open court that she had abused her authority and engaged in vindictive

5

After Valencia’s attorney explained that he and the prosecutor discussed the “dismissing and
refiling a new charge” possibility during plea negotiations, the prosecutor advised the court that
the parties had also discussed a second issue, as follows:
Prosecutor: And Judge, I just want to clarify for purposes of the record, since the
persistent violator was the issue that precipitated the defendant being allowed to
switch out his plea last time that the state indicated that, should he be convicted in
the no contact order case that was set for trial today, that the state would file the
persistent violator in the battery with the intent charge prior to sentencing and we
would be proceeding based on our . . . our reading of the case law and the authority
that we would be proceeding with the persistent violator . . . .
(Audio Ex. Dist Court4_20151203-1006, 8:35-9:20 (emphasis added).) The district court asked
the prosecutor whether any Idaho case law allows the entry of a mere guilty plea to be used as a
prior conviction for purposes of establishing a persistent violator enhancement, and the prosecutor
said that she was not aware of any. (Id., 12:17-12:45.)
10

prosecution for (allegedly) making such a threat, 6 the prosecutor made the following statement for
the record:
There were discussions whether or not the state would pursue or could pursue a
charge of forcible penetration with a foreign object. I can indicate that I had
conversations with [defense counsel], that I, based on the case law at the time and
based on . . . based on statute, the first incident where Mr. Valencia put his fingers
inside of the victim, I did not believe I could charge that because she was asleep at
the time, and the case law does require that there was force. That statute was
amended about a year and a half ago to address that issue. The issue was the second
one. The conversations that I had with [defense counsel] is that it was very unlikely
that the state would be pursuing those charges because we are and we were late in
the game, but it was certainly something that we did look at.
(Audio Ex. Dist Court 1_20151215-1603, 04:30-05:25 (emphasis added).)
The prosecutor’s comments about her conversations with defense counsel centered on two
separate “incidents” and issues, most likely those discussed at the plea entry hearing – (1) whether
the state could pursue a charge of forcible penetration with a foreign object, and (2) whether the
state could use a finding or verdict of guilt for felony violation of a no contact order as an
underlying “conviction” to charge Valencia as a persistent violator in his battery with intent to
commit rape case. In regard to “the first incident where Mr. Valencia put his fingers inside of the
victim,” the prosecutor said she had informed defense counsel that the state could not pursue the

6

At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, Valencia stated:
My attorney came to me previously on November or December 2nd, giving me an
hour to decide saying that the . . . the prosecution would dismiss this, this battery
with intent and file another charge of . . . potentially find me guilty of, and to me
Your Honor, that’s not, that’s not fair. To me She’s mis . . . abusing her authority,
and since the court already knows that I was pretty adamant to go to trial on the
battery with intent, and since, since the court already knows the degree of this
matter, I mean, for her to give that option and try to . . . dismissing and file
something else that they can potentially find me guilty on, to me that’s vindictive
prosecution.

(Audio Ex. Dist Court 1_20151215-1603, 01:15-02:05 (emphasis added).)
11

charge of forcible penetration with a foreign object because case law and the statute precluded that
charge when the victim was asleep at the time of the offense. 7 The prosecutor’s comment serves
to verify defense counsel’s statement at the earlier plea entry hearing that he and the prosecutor
had conversations about the state’s ability to pursue a forcible penetration with a foreign object
charge, but he was not saying that the state was going to file that charge.
In sum, Valencia’s attorney explained, prior to the entry of Valencia’s guilty plea, that he
and the prosecutor had discussed whether the state had the ability to dismiss the current charge
(battery with intent to rape) and file a new charge (forcible penetration with a foreign object), but
he was not saying that the state was going to do so. Those statements were not contradicted by
Valencia at the time they were made at the plea entry hearing, and they were supported by the
prosecutor’s comments at the start of the sentencing hearing, made in response to Valencia’s
impromptu oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (See Audio Ex. Dist Court4_20151203-1006,
00:00-04:40.) Those factors, all based on the record, belie Valencia’s claim that the prosecutor
threatened to dismiss his pending charge and file a new charge if he rejected the state’s plea offer.
See Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903, 174
P.3d 870, 873 (2007). The district court correctly concluded that, based on the record, “[t]he
perceived threat did not exist[,]” and the state “would have tried Valencia on the charge of . . .
Battery with Intent to Commit Rape – not Forcible Sexual Penetration by use of a Foreign Object.”
(R., p.181; cf. Appellant’s Brief, p.19 (“The record . . . does not show that Mr. Valencia was told

7

Valencia attributes the prosecutor’s statement about the “second” issue to the question of whether
the state could charge him with forcible penetration with a foreign object. (See Appellant’s Brief,
p.18 (stating in regard to whether the prosecutor could file the new charge, “based on the statute
prior to its amendment,” “[s]he said she told Mr. Valencia’s attorney that it was ‘very unlikely that
the State would be pursuing those charges . . . but it was certainly something that we did look
at’”).) The prosecutor’s comments show that those comments pertain to an entirely different issue
– most likely the “persistent violator” issue she discussed at the plea entry hearing.
12

by his attorneys, prior to pleading guilty, that the State would not dismiss the original charge and
refile the new charge.” (emphasis added)); see n.3, supra.)
Because Valencia failed to present any viable evidence that the prosecutor’s “threat”
existed, the court correctly determined that Valencia failed to establish a prima facie case showing
that his trial counsel’s performance was either deficient or prejudicial under Strickland. (See R.,
p.181.)
2.

The Record Shows That Valencia Pled Guilty To Avoid A Persistent Violator
Enhancement And Sex Offender Registration And That His Plea Was Made
Knowingly And Voluntarily

In concluding that Valencia failed to meet either prong of Strickland for demonstrating
ineffective assistance of counsel, the district court also held that his allegation of duress 8 “is further
belied by the record as he eventually explained to the Court that he was pleading guilty to avoid a
persistent violator enhancement and a requirement to register as a sex offender.” (R., p.180
(emphasis added).) The court was correct, despite the fact that Valencia made several comments
about the prosecutor “potentially” dismissing his pending charge and filing a new charge of
forcible penetration with a foreign object against him if he turned down the plea offer. In order to
assess the court’s determination that Valencia eventually divulged his two reasons for pleading

8

Valencia asserts that his guilty plea was not voluntary because it was coerced by the prosecutor’s
threat to dismiss his pending charge and charge him with forcible penetration with a foreign object
if he rejected the state’s plea offer. “Whether a plea is voluntary and understood entails inquiry
into three areas: (1) whether the defendant’s plea was voluntary in the sense that he understood the
nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself;
and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty.” State v.
Umphenour, 160 Idaho 503, 507, 376 P.3d 707, 711 (2016) (quoting State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32,
34, 557 P.2d 626, 628 (1976)).
13

guilty, it is necessary to review the progression of Valencia’s statements during the plea entry
hearing.
At that hearing, the court advised Valencia of all the rights he would be waiving if he pled
guilty, and Valencia said he understood and that he had reviewed the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and
the Guilty Plea Advisory Form. (Audio Ex. Dist Court4_20151203-1006, 36:15-39:22.) Valencia
told the court, in regard to the “duress” issue, that he was aware of the state potentially dismissing
his current charge and filing a new charge. (Id., 40:10-40:52.) However, the court’s follow-up
questioning ultimately shows that Valencia knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty pursuant to the
plea offer in order to avoid the persistent violator charge and the sex offender registration
requirement. The relevant portions of the plea entry hearing are as follows:
Judge: And you understand that an Alford plea provides that you will enter a plea
without being required to admit the facts underlying each of the cases that you’d be
pleading guilty, one, to take advantage of the plea agreement, and two, because
you’re concerned that if you go to trial you might be convicted. Is that why you’re
doing that?
Valencia: No . . .
Defense Counsel: It’s not necessarily why, but . . .
Judge: Well, I, at one place he’s saying he’s doing it under duress, on the answer
to question 14, “Is there any other reason,” and he says “yes” . . . that other reason
is duress.
Defense Counsel: I’ll let my client . . . .
Valencia: Yeah, I just, just a short amount of time and, just the notification that I
was aware that, if I was to proceed today, I would be subject to the persistent
violator if found guilty. I’m aware of that, as well as the potential dismissal of the
case on the battery issue and then . . . refiled it as a different issue . . . as another .
. . and just all that, kinda just . . . .
Judge: Well, you understand sir, you’ve been through this before, you understand
that I cannot accept any pleas of guilty unless you are entering them voluntarily . .
.
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Valencia: Oh, yes.
Judge: and fully, fully knowledgeable.
Valencia: Right.
Judge: Now let me . . . are you acting because you want to take advantage of the
plea agreement to avoid registering as a sex offender and to avoid the potential, I’m
not sure it’s there, but, the potential of them filing a persistent violator?
Valencia: Yes.
Judge: Okay. And you’re doing that on your own free and voluntary act and will?
Valencia: Yes.
Judge: And you understand what I have said earlier is that I, they can file a
persistent violator but there’s no law in the State of Idaho that says merely being,
having a jury convict you is a conviction for purposes of the persistent violator
statute?
Valencia: Yes.
Judge: So, they might file it, but there’s no telling what might happen if the case
were to go before the appellate courts because they’ve not ruled on that issue.
Valencia: Right.
Judge: But there, at this time, there is one judgment of conviction against you and
before they can file a persistent violator there need to be two judgments of
conviction, do you understand that?
Valencia: Yes.
Judge: And you understand . . . okay I, I’m concerned because I, you seem to be
waffling and saying you’re doing this because you’re being duressed into it.
Defense Counsel: And Judge, I think it’s not necessarily duress, it’s just, I think
it’s just all of the issues that we’ve put on the record that my client is trying to avoid
the potential consequences if he is convicted, and, what the, as far as the state’s
filing, what he could potentially face as far as any sort of, I guess, conviction, if
there was a conviction in the future, and I, I think that’s understandable. I think
every person that ends up pleading guilty, that is part of the reason they plead guilty.
It’s because they’re concerned with what would happen if they are convicted with
the consequences of that. So that’s why he doing that, and I think Julian would
agree with that.
15

Judge: Is that correct . . . Mr. Valencia? So if you enter pleas of guilty today, you’re
doing it voluntarily for the reasons your attorney just stated?
Valencia: Yes, Your Honor.
Judge: And you’re not under any duress? Is that correct?
Valencia: Yeah, yeah.
Judge: Is that “yes,” that is correct?
Valencia: Yeah.
Judge: Okay.
(Audio Ex. Dist Court4_20151203-1006, 39:20-43:40.)
After further discussion about the rights Valencia was waiving, his satisfaction with trial
counsel’s representation, and his answers on the Guilty Plea Advisory Form (see R., pp.135-143),
Valencia entered Alford pleas of guilty (see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)) to
aggravated battery (CR-2015-23313), one count of felony violation of a no contact order (CR2015-16500), and three counts of felony violation of a no contact order (CR-2015-21619) (Audio
Ex. Dist Court4_20151203-1006, 52:00-55:15). The court then questioned Valencia a final time
about the basis for his decision to plead guilty to those charges:
Judge: And are you entering your pleas, Alford pleas in each of these cases of your
own free and voluntary act and will?
Valencia: Yes, Your Honor.
Judge: And, and you’re entering them to take advantage of the plea agreement to
avoid the risk inherent in going to trial[9] and to avoid the risk inherent in being
convicted on the other charge of sexual battery which would require, require
registration as a sex offender, is that correct?
9

As the prosecutor stated at the plea entry hearing, one of the consequences of Valencia going to
trial was that the state was going to use a finding of guilt in a violation of a no contact order case
set for trial that day as the basis for filing a persistent violator allegation in the battery with intent
to rape case. (Audio Ex. Dist Court4_20151203-1006, 8:35-9:20.)
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Valencia: Yes, Your Honor.
(Audio Ex. Dist Court4_20151203-1006, 55:23-55:49.) That was Valencia’s last word on the
reasons he decided to accept the state’s plea offer – which did not include being under duress by
any threats by the prosecutor to dismiss the pending charge and pursue a charge of forcible
penetration with a foreign object if he rejected her offer. 10
Like any other civil litigant attempting to avoid an adverse summary judgment ruling, a
post-conviction petitioner does not raise a genuine issue of fact by merely contradicting in an
affidavit what he told the court, under oath, in a plea hearing.

(See Audio Ex. Dist

Court4_20151203-1006, 30:25-30:40 (oath)); see Frazier v. J.R. Simplot Co., 136 Idaho 100, 103,
29 P.3d 936, 939 (2001) (citation omitted) (impermissible to attempt to prevent an adverse
summary judgment ruling by creating factual issues in an affidavit which contradict prior sworn
deposition statements); Matter of Estate of Keeven, 126 Idaho 290, 298, 882 P.2d 427, 435 (Ct.
App. 1994) (a “sham” affidavit that directly contradicts previous testimony may be disregarded on
a summary judgment motion). Because the allegations in Valencia’ post-conviction petition were
affirmatively disproved by his prior sworn statements at the change of plea hearing, they did not
create a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing. Workman, 144
Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (post-conviction allegations insufficient for granting of relief when
they are clearly disproved by the record); Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 368, 924 P.2d 622, 630
(Ct. App. 1996) (same); see also Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir.

10

When subsequently asked by the district court whether those reasons were adequately stated,
Valencia’s trial counsel said, “It’s just to avoid consequences of conviction, additional charges,
different charges. It’s a culmination of everything . . . but yeah, it’s to take advantage of the deal
and the potential risks if he did not.” (Audio Ex. Dist Court4_20151203-1006, 55:50-56:21.)
Although defense counsel included “additional charges, different charges” in his reasons, Valencia
did not. The district court was entitled to take Valencia at his sworn word for why he pled guilty.
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1991) (recognizing that allowing parties to raise issues of fact simply by submitting an affidavit
contradicting prior testimony would greatly diminish the utility of summary judgment
proceedings). Despite Valencia’s post-conviction claim, the record shows that he pled guilty
pursuant to the state’s offer “to take advantage of the plea agreement to avoid the persistent violator
enhancement and registering as a sex offender” and “agreed that he entered the plea knowingly
and voluntarily and was not under duress.” (R., p.180.) Therefore, regardless of whether his
attorney’s performance was deficient, Valencia failed to demonstrate that such performance
prejudiced him – i.e., absent the deficient performance he would not have pled guilty pursuant to
the state’s plea offer. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Valencia has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in concluding that he failed
to present a prima facie ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim related to the failure to advise
him about the viability of the prosecutor’s alleged threat to dismiss the battery with intent to
commit rape charge, and charge him with forcible penetration with a foreign object. This Court
should therefore affirm the district court’s summary dismissal of Valencia’ post-conviction
petition.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order summarily
dismissing Valencia’ petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 11th day of March, 2019.

/s/ John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

JULIAN MARTIN VALENCIA

)
)

Plaintiff,

CASE N0. CV-2017-466

)

)

vs.

)

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION

)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Defendant.

)
)
)

On December

3,

2015, Valencia entered an Alford plea pursuant t0 a Rule

The Agreement addressed pending charges

CRJOI 3-2874 m Battery with

O

CR~2015—2 1 619

C

CR—2015—20659 - Third Violation ofNCO;
CR-ZOI 5-1 6500 — Third Violation ofNCO.

9

The

State agreed to

four violations

The Court

Intent to

Commit

a Serious Felony, t0 Wit: Rape;

Third Violation of NCO (3 counts);

the Battery with Intent charge t0 Aggravated Battery, charge

ofa NCO, and dismiss

persistent Violator

ﬁxed and

amend

agreement.

in four cases:

G

~~

11

the remaining charges.

The

him with

State also agreed to not ﬁle a

enhancement or require Valencia

to register as a

entered Judgment 0n January

2016, sentencing Valencia to four (4) years

six (6) indeterminate, with credit for

6,

sex offender.

1054 days served.
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On October
1.

2017, Valencia ﬁled an

17,

Amended Veriﬁed

Petition alleging

Ineffective Assistance 0f Counsel: Trial counsel failed t0

psychosexual evaluation and
Trial

counsel’s

if

for a second

inﬂuenced Petitioner’s dccisicn to plead guilty.
do so fell beneath an objective standard 0f
they had performed differently, the result would have been

failure

reasonableness and

move

two claims:

this

to

different.

Assistance of Counsel: Trial counsel advised the Petitioner that if he

2. Ineffective

December 15, 2015 by signing the Plea Agreement, the
would ﬁle a new change of Forcible Sexual Penetration by use 0f a Foreign
Object “where the victim is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act
did not plead guilty on
State

(a.) was unconscious 0r asleep; 0r (13.) was not aware,
knowing, perceiving or cognizant that the act occurred.” See Idaho Code § 18-

because the victim:

6608(4). Tn'al counsel

was aware

2013, but did not inform the Petitioner that
effect until July

performance

performed

The Court ﬁled a

1,

fell

on January 27,
the code section stated did not g0 into

that the alleged act occurred

2014. See S.L. 2014, ch. 165, eff July

differently, the result

would have been

2014. Trial counsel’s

different.

on November

notice 0f intent t0 dismiss the petition

response t0 the notice and the State

Rule 11 Agreement,

1,

beneath an objective standard of reasonableness and if they had

CD

moved

3,

2017. Valencia ﬁled a

the Court to take judicial notice of the Informations,

recordings of the change of plea and sentencing hearings, the Guilty

Plea Advisory Form, and the Judgment and Commitment.

LEGAL STANDARDS
I.

Post-Conviction Reiief Standard
Post~conviction proceedings are governed

Act, LC. §§ 19-4901

w

19-4911.

A

by

the

petition for post~con9icti0u relief

governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Ridgley
925, 928 (2010).

An

Uniform Post~C0nvicti0n Procedure

v.

application for post-conviction relief

admissible evidence supporting

allegations 0r

will

is

a civil proceeding,

State, 148 Idaho 671, 674,

227 P.3d

must present 0r be accompanied by

be subject

t0 dismissal. State

v.

Payne,

146 Idaho 548, 560, 199 P.3d 123, 135 (2008). Because post-conviction proceedings are

civil in

its

it
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nature, the petitioner

State,

must prove the

allegations

by

a preponderance

0f the evidence. Murray

v.

156 Idaho 159, 163, 321 P.3d 709, 713 (2014).

To

withstand

summary

dismissal, the petitioner

element of his 0r her claims for
(2003).

The

relief.

State

v.

standard for analyzing a motion for

must

establish a primafacz’e case for each

Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 9O P.3d 278, 297

summary

dismissal

is

“whether a genuine issue

of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any afﬁdavits 0n
ﬁle.” Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 675,

fact

when

it

227 P.3d

at 929.

An

application fails t0 allege genuine issues of

unsupported by admissible evidence. Taylor

is

v.

State,

145 Idaho 866, 870, 187

P.3d 1241, 1245 (Ct. App. 2008).

II.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To

prevail

on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim pursuant

t0 Strickland, the

defendant must show that his or her attorney’s perfonnance was deﬁcient and that he or she was
prejudiced by the deﬁciency. Murray, 156 Idaho

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
defendant must

show

reasonableness. 1d.

that,

the

S.

Ct.

164, 321 P.3d at 714 (citing Strickland

v.

2052 (1984)). T0 prove deﬁcient performance, the
fell

below an objective standard 0f

prejudice, the defendant

must show a reasonable probabiiity

attorney’s

T0 demonstrate

at

representation

but for the attorney’s deﬁcient performance, the outcome of the action would have been

different. Id.

outcome.”

“A

Id.

reasonable probability

the defendant

a probability sufﬁcient to undermine conﬁdence in the

“T0 undermine conﬁdence

‘conceivable,’ likelihood

When

is

ofa

in the

outcome requires

a

‘substantial,’

not just

different result.” Id.

the defendant alleges

must demonstrate

some deﬁciency

in counsel’s advice regarding a guilty plea,

that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors,

he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
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at 715.

However, the petitioner must do more than mereiy

state in his petition 0r supporting

afﬁdavit that he would not have pleaded guilty. Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 677, 227 P.3d
Rather, he must attempt to draw,

by way of admissible evidence,

a causal connection

the alleged deﬁciencies and his decision t0 plead guilty. Id. Ifhe does not

he

Under
all

Idaho

at

between

this connection,

Strickland, counsel

is

strongly

presumed

t0

have rendered adequate assistance and

signiﬁcant decisions in the exercise 0f reasonable professional judgment. Murray, 156
165, 321 P.3d at 715. Thus, the applicant bears a

attorney's

(Ct.

931.

demonstrate prejudice. Id.

fails to

made

make

at

App.

performance was deﬁcient. Davis

v.

Stare,

“Because of the distorting

1989).

heavy burden

proving that his

in

116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248

effects

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, there

is

of hindsight
a strong

in

reconstructing

presumption that counsel's

performance was within the Wide range 0f reasonable professional assistance-that
strategy.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct.
tactical decisions

decisions are

made by

made upon

trial

at

the

is,

‘sound

trial

2065). Therefore, strategic or

counsel will not be second~guessed on review, unless those

a basis of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, 0r

other shortcomings capable 0f objective evaluation. Estrada

v.

State,

143 Idaho 558, 561, 149

P.3d 833, 836 (2006).

ANALYSIS
Petitioner asserts that he

0f his cases, and

was denied

effective assistance of counsel during the resolution

that but for his counsel’s errors,

have insisted 0n going

t0 trial.

The

he would not have pleaded guilty and would

ﬁrst claim alleges that his counsel failed t0

psychosexual evaluation, and the second alleges his counsel advised him that
the plea, the State

move

if

for a

new

he did not sign

would charge him with Forcible Sexual Penetration by use 0f a Foreign
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Objectw-a statute that was amended between the time 0f the crime and sentencing. Both claims
are belied

by

the record.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Claim

1

move

Valencia alleges his counsel was ineffective for failing t0

for a

new psychosexual

evaluation, and this inﬂuenced his decision t0 plead guilty. Valencia entered an Alford plea t0 a

reduced charge of Aggravated Battery and four counts 0f violating a

NCO

agreement. In exchange, the State dropped the Battery with Intent to

Commit Rape

ﬁﬁh

violation of a

NCO‘ The

State also agreed not to ﬁle a persistent violator

require Valencia t0 register as a sex offender.

Both

parties stipulated

PSI and the PSE previously ordered. At the sentencing hearing,

no

pursuant t0 a Rule 11

all

charge and a

enhancement or

on the record

to

using the

parties agreed that there

were

additions, corrections, or changes needed to the PSI.

Although Valencia claims the

failure t0 order a

second

standard of reasonableness, he failed to put forth any facts to
failed t0

offered

show how

r10 facts to

a

new

show

PSE

fell

beneath an objective

show how he was prejudiced or

evaluation would have resulted in a different outcome. Valencia

that the

Conn would have even

granted a request for a second PSE.

such, Valencia failed to establish deﬁcient performance and prejudice, and this claim

is

As

subject

t0 dismissal.

Ineffective Assistance

of Counsel Claim

2.

Valencia also alleges that his counsel was ineffective by failing to inform him of the 2014

amendments
which the

to

LC.

§

18660801)

~

Forcible Sexual Penetration

by use of a Foreign Object,

State allegedly threatened t0 charge during plea negotiations. According t0 Valencia,

the battery took place in January of 2013.

The

statute

was amended and

effective July

1,

2014 as

follows:
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Every person who, for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratiﬁcation 0r abuse, causes
however slight, 0f the genital or anal opening of another person,

the penetration,

by any

object, instrument or device;
Against
the victim's will by:
(1)

Use of force or

(a)

Violence; or

(b) Duress,; 0r

Threats 0f immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent

(c)

power 0f execution,; 0r
(2) Where the victim is

incapable, through any unsoundness 0f mind, whether
temporary 0r permanent, of giving legal conscnt,; or
(3) Where the victim is prevented from resistance by any intoxicating, narcotic or
anesthetic substance,; or

Where the victim

(4)

is

at the time unconscious

of the nature 0f the act because

the victim:
(a)
(b)

shall

Was unconscious 0r asleep; 0r
Was not aware, knowing, perceiving 0r cognizant

be guilty 0f a felony and

prison for not

LC.

§

more

than

which was added

At

be punished by imprisonment

him under

italics).

Valencia asserts that he pled guilty because the

the forcible penetration statute using the

after the acts took place. Again, the claim

his sentencing hearing

on December

15,

is

belied

by the

new language

record.

2015, Valencia personally addressed the

Court, stating that he felt the State “was being unfair”, and “abusing

to

in the state

life.

18—6608 (amendments added in

State threatened t0 charge

shall

that the ac! occurred

ﬁle additional charges. Valencia told the Court he

felt

its

authority”

by threatening

such actions were “vindictive

prosecution.” Valencia also stated on the record the he “was under duress because 0f the short

amount of time he was given
and wanted

to

g0

t0 trial

charges brought against

Commit

t0

make

a decision.” Valencia told the Court he

“on the charges

that are being brought forth against

him were ﬁve counts 0f

a Serious Felony, t0 wit:

Rapamnot

Violation 0f a

NCO

was “confused”

me.” However, the

and Battery with Intent

Forcible Sexual Penetration

t0

by use 0f a Foreign

Object.

The
explained

State then addressed the Court regarding the “potential other charge.”

that

the

State

contemplated pursuing a forcible penetration
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discussions with Valencia’s counsel, decided against

not believe

it

Ms. Kallin explained

that the State did

could have brought the charge based 0n the case law, the Statute

crime took place, and

its

at the

time the

subsequent amendment. Therefore, because the State did not bring the

charge, Valencia could not have been ﬂied on

from asserting a defense

that

was in

explained by Ms. Kallin at the hearing,

notwand

it.

new

did notM—bring the

Valencia’s allegation

is

At

him”

is

not supported

were aware of the reasons

parties

by

As

record.

that the State could

charge.

by

further belied

Court that he was pleading guilty
register as a sex offender.

fact available to

all

was “precluded

Valencia’s allegation that he

it.

to

the record as he eventually explained to the

avoid a persistent violator enhancement and

a

requirement t0

was “under

the change of plea hearing, Valencia remarked he

duress” and noted that “there was a short amount of time and notiﬁcation if he proceeded today,

he would be subject
guilty plea unless

it

t0 the Persistent Violator

t0 take

The Court then noted
intelligently.

Aﬁer

it

would not accept

advantage 0f the plea agreement

appears that

trial

counsel’s strategy

was not under
was

his

further examination, the

t0

avoid the

enhancement and registering as a sex offender. Valencia then agreed

entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily and

It

.

was entered knowingly and

Court determined Valencia was acting
persistent violator

.”
.

that

he

duress.

t0 negotiate a deal that limited

Valencia’s

exposure in terms of the number of convictions, as well as the length of potential incarceration.

He

successfully negotiated an outcome that resulted in an

potential punishment, the dismissal

by the

State,

no requirement

Petitioner’s claim

is

0f an enhancement, a

t0 register as a sex offender,

belied

by the

record.

maximum

less

sentencing recommendation

and no additional criminal charges.

The Rule

Form, and the change 0f plea and sentencing hearings
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knowingly and voluntarilymnot the
exist, as the State

explained.

him

He

State

would have

Commit Rapemnot

Battery with Intent to

Object.

The

of threat 0r coercion. The perceived threat did not

result

Valencia on the charge 0f Sexual

tried

Forcible Sexual Penetration

by use 0f

a Foreign

cannot be preciuded from asserting a defense that would not have been available to

in the ﬁrst place.

As

such, Petitioner has failed

performance or prejudice and the claim

is

t0

establish

trial

counsel’s deﬁcient

subj ect to dismissal.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Petitioner’s

prejudiced

by

the

claims that his attorney’s performance was deﬁcient and that he was

deﬁciency are belied by the record. As such,

all

claims

are hereby

DISMISSED.

Datedthis
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